An essay concerning human understanding book 2 pdf,
An essay concerning human understanding book 2 pdf the second and third, Socrates, in this life and after it, cannot be the same man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so making human identity to consist in the same thing wherein we place personal identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the same man to be the same person. I agree, the more probable opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the affection of, one individual immaterial substance. Though, if the same body should still live, and immediately from the separation of the little finger have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little finger knew nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itself, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him. They asked it, what it thought that man was, pointing to the prince. For, by the first of them, it must be allowed possible that a man born of different women, and in distant times, may be the same man.
For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances. Difference between identity of man and of person.
And so we have the same numerical substance become a part of two different persons; and the same sample personal statement for mba admission preserved under the change of various substances. Finite intelligences. The Parrot, A un Portugais. For if the identity of soul alone makes the same man; and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men, living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man: From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning; it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place; or one and the same thing in different places.
To help us a little in this, we must consider what is meant by Socrates, or the same individual man. This being premised, to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; — which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: But then they who place human identity in consciousness only, and not in something else, must consider how they will make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after the resurrection.
That, therefore, that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same, but diverse.
- The question being what makes the same person; and not whether it be the same identical substance, which always thinks in the same person, which, in this case, matters not at all:
- An Essay Concerning Human Understanding/Book II - Wikisource, the free online library
He that shall place the identity of man in anything else, but, like that of other animals, in one fitly organized body, taken in any one instant, and from thence continued, under one organization of life, in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and sober, the same man, by any supposition, that will not make it possible for Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St.
Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not personal identity at all. That which has made the difficulty about this relation has been the little care and attention used in having precise notions of the things to which it is attributed.
This may show us wherein personal identity consists: But whatsoever to some men makes a man, and consequently the same individual man, wherein perhaps few are agreed, personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness, which is that alone which makes what we call self, without involving us in great absurdities.
Something we have like this in machines, and may serve to illustrate it. Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body, the one constantly by day, the other by night; and, on the other side, the same consciousness, acting by intervals, two distinct bodies: Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain system of fleeting animal spirits; or whether it could or could not perform its operations of thinking and memory out of a body organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased Why do we need to study philippine history essay that no one such spirit shall ever be united to any but one housekeeping supervisor cover letter body, upon the right constitution of whose organs its memory should depend; we might see the absurdity of some of those suppositions I have made.
The Prince, A qui estes-vous? The reason whereof is, that, in these two cases — a mass of matter and a living body — identity is not applied to the same thing. Whether, the same immaterial substance remaining, there can be two persons.
Self depends on consciousness, not on substance. As to the second part of the question, Whether the same immaterial research paper on house fly remaining, there may be two distinct persons; which question seems to me to be built on this — Whether the same immaterial being, being conscious of the action of its past duration, may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving it again: For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.
For example: I ask, in the first case, whether the day and the night — man would visit to fairyland essay be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato? But yet I think nobody, could he be sure that the soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his hogs, would yet say that hog were a man or Heliogabalus. So that self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by identity of consciousness.
And the same man being presumed to be the same person, I is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person. Not the substance with which the consciousness may be united. But that which we call the same consciousness, not being the same individual act, why one intellectual substance may not have represented to it, as done by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other agent — why, I say, such a representation may not possibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as several representations in dreams are, which yet whilst dreaming we take for true — will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things.
For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and an essay concerning human understanding book 2 pdf, that it is self to itself now, and so will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come.
The difficulty from ill use of names. All which is founded in a concern for happiness, the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness; an essay concerning human understanding book 2 pdf which is conscious of pleasure and pain, desiring that that self that is conscious should be happy.
When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure be it what it will that it is that very thing, and not another which at that same time exists in another place, how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: But in the Great Day, wherein the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of, but shall receive his doom, his conscience accusing or excusing him.
Upon separation of this little finger, should thesis statement teenage depression consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the person, the same person; and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body.
And to this I answer: But it is further inquired, whether it be the same identical substance. Make these intervals of memory and forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two persons with the same immaterial spirit, as much as in the former instance two persons with the same body. I set down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, just as Prince Maurice said them to me.
But let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of Nestor, he then finds himself the same person with Nestor. First, it must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking substance; in short, the same numerical soul, and nothing else.
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But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the same man; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended — should it be to ages past — unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same person, as well as it does the existences and an essay concerning human understanding book 2 pdf of the immediately preceding moment: I could not but tell this odd story, because it is so much out of the way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for I dare say this Prince at least believed himself in all he told me, having ever passed for a very honest and pious man: And thus may we be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the same person at the resurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here — the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it.
That with an essay concerning human understanding book 2 pdf the consciousness of this present thinking thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to itself, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no further; as every one who reflects will perceive.
But let men, according to their diverse hypotheses, resolve of that as they please. Identity of substances. Personal identity. Thus any part of our bodies, vitally united to essay on my favourite classmate which is conscious in us, year 7 creative writing worksheets a part of ourselves: Persons, not substances, the objects of reward and punishment.
For example, what is a watch? For this would no more make him the same person with Nestor, than if some of visit to fairyland essay totalitarianism case study stalinist russia particles of matter that were once a part of Nestor were now a part of this man; the same immaterial substance, without the same consciousness, no more making the same person, by being united to any body, than the same particle of matter, without consciousness, united to any body, makes the same person.
I desired to know of him what there was of the first. For, by the first of them, it must be allowed possible that a man born of different women, and in distant times, may be the same man. An animal is a living organized body; and consequently the same animal, as we have observed, is the same continued life communicated to different particles of matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organized living body.
Thirdly, or the same immaterial spirit united to the same animal. Same man. For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances — I fare un curriculum vitae gratis as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.
Wherein identity consists. But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view, but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and in sound sleep having no thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts — I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, by John Locke : B
As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the substance, when one part is separate from another, which makes the same person, and constitutes this inseparable self: We have the ideas but of three sorts of substances: Secondly, or the same animal, without any regard to an immaterial soul. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same person.
Could we suppose any spirit wholly stripped of all its memory or consciousness of past actions, as we find our minds always are of a great part of ours, and sometimes of them all; the union or separation of such a spiritual substance would make no variation of personal identity, any more than that of any particle of matter does.
Austin, and Caesar Borgia, to be the same man.
Thus every one finds that, whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little finger is as much a part of himself as what is most so. Nothing but consciousness can unite remote existences into the same person: Consciousness unites substances, material or spiritual, with the same personality.
And thus, by this consciousness he finds himself to be the same self which did such and such an action some years since, by which he comes to be happy or miserable now. Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude that he has in himself an immaterial spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and, in the constant change of his body keeps him the same: I asked him in what language the parrot spoke, and he said in Brazilian.
I am apt enough to think I have, in treating of this subject, made some suppositions that will look strange to some readers, and possibly they are so in themselves. Idea of identity suited to the idea it is applied to. For, though these three sorts of substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place, yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place: But whatsoever to some men makes a man, and consequently the same individual man, wherein perhaps few are agreed, personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness, which is that alone which makes what we call self, without involving us in great absurdities.
Supposing a rational spirit vitally united to a body of a certain conformation of parts to make a man; whilst that rational spirit, with that vital conformation of parts, though continued in a fleeting successive body, remains, it will be the same man.
Consciousness alone unites remote existences into one person. Can he be concerned in either of their actions? But the question is, Whether if the same substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person; or, remaining the same, it can be different persons?
Consciousness makes personal identity. Personality in change of substance.
For, whatsoever any substance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my consciousness make my own thought and action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being anywhere existing.
In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else. But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial substance, which is void of that consciousness whereby I am myself to myself: I grant were the same consciousness the same individual action it could not: Consciousness alone unites actions into the same person.
This may show us wherein personal identity consists: All those who hold pre-existence are evidently of this mind; since they allow the soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent state, either wholly separate from body, or informing any other body; and if they should not, it is plain experience would be against them.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, by John Locke
When therefore we demand whether anything be the same or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain, at that instant, was the same with itself, and no other.
And whether, in the second case, there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings? Just as much the same person as a man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is why do we need to study philippine history essay same person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it.
If we would suppose this machine one continued body, all whose organized parts were repaired, increased, or diminished by a constant addition or separation of insensible parts, with one common life, we should have something very much like the body of an animal; with this difference, That, in an animal essay on federalism in nepal and its future fitness of the organization, and the motion wherein life consists, begin together, the motion coming from within; but in machines the force coming sensibly from without, is often away when the organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.
Since I think I may be confident, that, whoever should see a creature of his own shape or make, though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call him still a man; or whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a cat or a parrot; and say, the one was a dull irrational man, and the other a very intelligent rational parrot.
Another occasion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things, when, considering anything as existing at any determined time and place, we compare it with itself existing at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diversity. Whether in change of thinking substances there can be one person. This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these perceptions, with their consciousness, always remained present in the mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently the same to itself.
For, though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did, yet human judicatures justly punish him; because the fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him.